COMMANDERS DIGEST

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CHANGE OF COMMAND—Top American leaders in the Pacific gather aboard the Navy LST USS Garrett County in Saigon as VAdm. Elmo R. Zumwalt Jr. (left), succeeds RAdm. Kenneth L. Veth (right), as Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Vietnam. From left are: Adm. Zumwalt, Gen. Creighton W. Abrams, Commander, MACV; Ellsworth Bunker, U.S. Ambassador to Vietnam; Adm. John S. McCain Jr., Commander in Chief, Pacific, and Adm. Veth.

SecDef Decides Against Deploying Armored Cavalry Unit to Vietnam

Secretary of Defense Clark M. Clifford has approved a recommendation made by Gen. Creighton W. Abrams, Commander, MACV, to speed the shipment of certain additional heavy vehicles and communications equipment to South Vietnam rather than deploy another U. S. armored cavalry squadron of about 1,000 men.

In Saigon, MACV said its recommendation resulted from a continuing series of studies designed to determine how to further speed up ARVN expansion and to best use U.S. manpower under the current ceiling.

The studies indicated, MACV said, that the U.S. combat requirement for additional armored units is presently not as great as the need to accelerate the combat readiness of new ARVN armored units.

The accelerated delivery of equipment will contribute significantly to speeding up the commitment to combat of at least two ARVN armored cavalry squadrons during fiscal 1969, MACV added.

In Washington, the Army said the action will enable the government of South Vietnam to accelerate the activation programmed South Vietnamese mechanized units as well as provide additional equipment for existing South Vietnamese units.

In approving the action, Secretary Clifford emphasized that in view of this strengthening of ARVN armored

(Continued on Page 7)

Senate Committee Publishes Report On Strategic Power

The United States today has strategic nuclear forces which, under any reasonable circumstances, are adequate to perform their deterrence role.

However, there is little ground for complacency when the future force effectiveness is so sensitive to timely decisions, superior technology, and adequate intelligence.

This was the conclusion of a report on the status of U.S. strategic power submitted by the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee of the Senate's Committee on Armed Services.

The report, published Sept. 27, points out that "despite the immediate urgency of the war in Southeast Asia, in the long run the balance of strategic nuclear power is the defense problem which is of the greatest and most overriding importance to this country," and adds that ". . . if we fall behind in the strategic nuclear field, we could lose our national existence."

The report is the culmination of extensive hearings in which the subcommittee took testimony from top civilian and military defense officials, as well as officials of the intelligence agencies.

In an appearance before the subcommittee, Gen. Earle G. Wheeler, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said that "our national security objective may be stated as follows: 'to preserve the United States as a free and independent nation, safeguarding its fundamental values, and to preserve its freedom to pursue its national objectives as the leading world power.'"

Gen. Wheeler added that the basic

(Continued on Page 7)

Clifford Reports to LBJ on Economy Effort

Secretary of Defense Clark M. Clifford made his first report to President Johnson Oct. 3 on the continuing efforts to achieve economy and increased efficiency within the Defense Department.

He said he had reviewed the cost reduction programs of the department and was firmly convinced that "we must never relax our vigil to eliminate waste," and never slacken the search for more economical practices.

Secretary Clifford told President Johnson he was "immensely im pressed" with the record of accomplishment he found.

"This record shows that in the preceding six years, the military departments had produced audited savings of over $15 billion.

"The Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps and Defense agencies had produced these savings—not at the expense of combat effectiveness—but by (1) more efficiency in determining requirements for materiel, (2) more economic methods of contracting for supplies and equipment, and (3) lower costs of operating our bases and support activities," Secretary Clifford said.

He told the President that he had issued instructions that these excellent efforts were to be fully maintained—and that more new ideas for management improvement were to be sought vigorously.

"We have just summarized the results of our efforts to reduce costs and improve management in the 12 months of fiscal year 1968. I am pleased to report that the military departments have not only continued the outstanding record of the past, but have added some new accomplishments.

These new accomplishments, he told the President, are:

1—Under the regular Cost Reduction Program, carried on primarily by our logistic support activities, new savings achieved in FY68 exceeded $1.2 billion. This is 17 per cent above the goal which these activities had established for the year.

2—When added to the accomplishments of the preceding six years, this means that over $16 billion has been saved since 1962 as the result of new and intensified management actions throughout the Department of Defense.

3—In addition, there has been a dramatic new contribution to lower costs in the past year. General Westmoreland and his successor in Vietnam, General Abrams, inaugurated and pushed a program known as "MACONOMY," designed to attain the most effective and efficient use of resources. This special program produced savings in excess of $500 million in FY68—a remarkable achievement in the midst of a major combat effort.

Secretary Clifford told President Johnson that the actions of the past year would be reflected in budget estimates for FY70, "and will help us live within the budget limits required by the Revenue and Expenditure Control Act of 1968."

The Secretary said he had determined that the program should continue to operate "under very tight ground rules." He said he would insist that every savings reported "be validated by independent audit. Only those savings resulting from better management—getting the required job done at least cost—will qualify as true cost reductions," he added.

"The principal objectives of the Cost Reduction Program will continue to be: 1—Buying only what we need; 2—Buying at the lowest sound price, and 3—Reducing operating costs.

"FY1968 savings," Secretary Clif-Clifford continued, "are the result of more than 27,000 separate management actions, each of which has been reviewed and validated by independent audit."

Navy Ships Get 'Cool' Gunpowder

Combat ships of the Navy can stay on the firing line for longer periods of time with the development of a new gunpowder called NACO, for "Navy Cool." The new gunpowder will effectively double the life of its rapid-fire guns.

NACO burns at temperatures 300 degrees cooler than standard gunpowder and the reduced heat helps lessen gun barrel wear by more than 50 percent. The lower-burning rate is achieved by decreasing the amount of nitrocellulose normally used to produce gunpowder and adding an oily substance which acts as a coolant.

Cooler burning helps prolong the life of the liners inside the barrels of naval guns. They must be replaced periodically because of erosion caused largely by heat.

NACO was developed by the Naval Ordnance Station at Indian Head, Md., after extensive research and testing.

FY68 Cost Reduction Statistics

	Savings Goal FY68	Savings Realized FY68 ($ Millions)	Estimated Value of Savings 1968-1970
Buy Only What We Need	$ 645	$ 693	$1,245
Buying At The Lowest Sound Price	93	97	195
Reducing Operating Costs	304	429	1,194
TOTAL	$1,042	$1,219	$2,634

COMMANDERS DIGEST

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AF Secretary Gives Views on Cost Reduction

Secretary of the Air Force Harold Brown believes that national security must take precedence over cost reduction but that it must always be remembered that in the long run a sound economy is as essential to national security as adequate military forces.

Speaking at a cost reduction awards ceremony in Los Angeles Oct. 3, he said, "However, we must not neglect the first and cardinal rule: there must be no alleged savings that affect our combat capabilities to meet our national responsibilities and commitments. On the other hand it is essential that in achieving and maintaining those capabilities there be no economic waste."

He pointed out that we have many responsibilities all over the world, just as we have responsibilities at home. In addition to our commitments to others, we have commitments to ourselves. "It is important to us to protect freedom from aggression and preserve the liberty of action which is the very essence of our society. It takes weapons, to do this job."

According to Dr. Brown, cost reduction programs are a positive force in enabling the Defense Department to accomplish more with what is available. A clear expression of our goal is that we must receive "a dollar's value for every dollar spent."

He mentioned that in most instances, our economic system contains built-in devices to insure efficient, economical operations. The competition of the market place and the preemptory decisions of the consumer serve to eliminate the unresponsive, inefficient or obsolescent producer.

"There are," he said, "instances in which these natural forces are impeded or made irrelevant, either by the nature of the product bought or the procedures of the buyer. The fact that the Defense Department is the single consumer of many products of defense industry can result in distortion of the normal conditions of the market place."

He pointed out that DOD procedures are constantly under review so that healthy competition will result in the best product at the most favorable price.

"Not all of our cost reduction accomplishments are translated into numerical statistics such as dollars and percentages," he said, citing value engineering as an example.

He illustrated his point with the Air Force conversion of the T-37 trainer to an attack aircraft in Southeast Asia. It was proven that the A-37 can perform for prolonged periods of sustained combat with minimum maintenance and turn-around time.

"This relatively simple weapons system is demonstrating unusual effectiveness in the type of mission for which more complex and costly aircraft are not only unnecessary but in some cases less effective."

Secretary Brown said there was another type of cost reduction which must also be kept in mind. In the non-standard market relation prevailing in advanced technology for defense equipment, "We must make decisions based on accurate assessments of technological risk. The degree of risk we may be willing to accept in any development is clearly related to the expected improvement in military combat capabilities which may result from taking that risk and the collateral cost and schedule risks which may be entailed."

He cited as an example, a risk in a development which increases the accuracy of a missile system may be worth taking, provided the schedule risk is within bounds, but there would be no justification for taking the same kind of technical risk to achieve improvements in secondary support or housekeeping functions, even those related to that same system.

Secretary Brown mentioned that whether savings come about from careful evaluation of technical risks, value engineering or some other category, "the one basic point we cannot lose sight of is that cost reduction is a human program. It really measures the extent that people use their heads to solve problems.

"Lasting results derive from motivated people who will continually act and think constructively. Ideas are needed on a continuing basis."

PAKISTANI ARRIVAL—Air Marshal Malik Nur Khan, Chief of Staff, Pakistan Air Force, and Gen. T. J. Conway, Commander in Chief, U.S. Strike Command, salute the colors during the arrival ceremony on the MacDill AFB flightline.

A Pandora's Box for Africa?

THE WAR IN NIGERIA

The background of the war in Nigeria was recently discussed by Assistant Secretary of State Joseph Palmer 2nd in a statement before the Subcommittee on Africa of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Below are excerpts from his statement of 11 September.

The civil war in Nigeria is daily resulting in a mounting death rate, not only on the battlefields, but in towns, villages, and the countryside on both sides of the combat lines. Millions of innocent victims of the conflict—old men, women and children—are in need. And many are dying of starvation while a concerned world opinion agonizingly watches an inadequate flow of assistance to the needy.

The African Past

Let me first try to put these problems in a wider African perspective.

A glance at the map of Africa reveals the widespread proliferation of political entities. The process of decolonization—most of it in the past 10 years—has already resulted in 41 independent states on the continent and its offshore islands. And the eventual number may run upwards of 45.

It is necessary to recall that these boundaries were not drawn in Africa by Africans for African reasons. They were delineated in Europe by Europeans for European reasons—commercial, strategic, prestige, etc. For the most part, they ignored a host of ethnic, religious, and economic considerations which might have resulted in more rational political units.

The colonial system produced other subsidiary problems for independent Africa. Lines of communication, for example, were developed primarily to evacuate produce to the sea and to tie Africa to Europe. There was little emphasis on the lateral communications which would tie Africans to Africans and lay the framework for future nationbuilding and cooperation among nations.

Even more importantly, the institutional framework was lacking during most of the colonial period for hastening the process of extending group understanding.

Late in the colonial period, the effort was made to reverse these policies and brief periods of self-government preceded independence in almost all cases. But the institutions that emerged in most cases were fragile—too European in their inspiration to meet the needs and aspirations of an African culture and society.

I do not intend in any way to detract from some of the positive benefits that derived from the colonial period. But what I do suggest is that the colonial system tended to isolate Africa from a process of natural political change —African change—for many generations.

Policy of the New Nations

How have the Africans reacted to the situation they have inherited?

● First, they have taken a strong position against territorial change by force or subversion. The principle is enshrined in the charter of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and constitutes a recognition that any violent change in the political boundaries of independent Africa can open up Pandora's box for the rest of the continent.

● Secondly, the nations of Africa have, for the most part, taken a similarly strong stand against secession. They feel that they must start from a premise that the various ethnic groups—numbering some 2,000—can reconcile their differences within the present national boundaries of Africa and build toward a national identity. Otherwise, they feel, a process may be started which may affect any of them and may hopelessly fractionalize their continent. It is for this reason that all but four of the 40 members of the OAU have refused to recognize the secession of Biafra.

● Thirdly, the nations of Africa feel a strong compulsion to develop their institutions—and their constitutional arrangements—in a manner that reflects African values and African imperatives. Central to this effort is a goal of national conciliation and consensus within an African framework.

What we are talking about is in the first instance a problem for Nigerians but one that is inseparable from the problems of Africa. Beyond this there are of course the Commonwealth and United Nations dimensions. But we have not at any point regarded this as a unilateral American problem. I say this with the utmost of concern and compassion for good and valued friends on both sides.

The U.S. by itself cannot expect to solve this agonizing and complex problem. We can be, and we should be, a voice of conscience—a strong one indeed—working with and through others in an international effort to save lives and to prevent human tragedy. This is what we have tried—and continue to try—to do.

No Absolute Right or Wrong

How did these tragic events come to pass? Like most human tragedies, there is no absolute right and no absolute wrong.

Britain had the choice before independence of dividing Nigeria into its three principal ethnic groups— Ibo, Yoruba, and Hausa-Fulani; into three separate states, or of retaining them as one. The principal proponents of unity at the time were the Ibos, then led by Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe—American educated, a great African and subsequently the first President of Nigeria.

The more traditional Hausa-Fulani North was doubtful, mistrustful at the time, and strongly inclined to think in terms of partition. But a great Northern leader, Sir Abubakar Tafawa Belewa . . . after seeing what we had done [in the U.S.] in building a nation of people of diverse cultural, ethnic, and religious backgrounds and of diverse geographical conditions . . . became convinced Nigeria could do the same.

Tribal Loyalty: An African Problem

For more than 5 years, Nigeria showed promise of realizing its potential as the largest and one of the richest countries in Africa.

To the outside observer, Nigeria during these years gave the appearance of a parliamentary democracy. There was at the center a government and an opposition. Yet closer examination revealed that the government was an alliance between tribally based parties in the East and North on the one hand and a tribally based opposition party in the West on the other hand.

Subsequently, this marriage of convenience was to give way to an alliance between the North and a doubtfully valid government in the West against the East. The weakness in both situations was the degree of alienation involved in the virtual exclusion of large sections of the country from participation in the process of government. Principles, issues, and national interests tended to be subordinated to local imperatives in specific situations.

From the beginning, this already complicated situation was compounded by the positions of the minority tribal elements. . . . There minority elements—of substantial strength in and of themselves—were resistant to the efforts of the regionally based parties to try to dominate their regions.

The existing instrument for achieving a national consensus of all these diverse groups was destroyed on 15 January 1966 by a small group of officers—mostly Ibos—who assassinated Sir Abubakar, the Prime Minister of Nigeria. The Premiers of Western and Northern Nigeria were also murdered at the same time.

The rebels, of course, had their own reasons for acting as they did. They were dissatisfied with the pace of modernization. Decisions were few and far between. Corruption was widespread. And as already indicated, important elements of the population were excluded from participation in the decision-making process.

But even at this point, elements in the army, including Ibos, recognized that events had been carried too far and that the country could be torn apart unless corrective action were taken at once. They therefore stepped in to reassert legality and to try to redress the damage that had been done to the national fabric.

But the effort was too weak and too late.

We have here all the elements of the classic Greek tragedy—the combination of mistakes, misunderstandings, and wrongs that create such emotion, bitterness and alienation as to lead to the darkest of suspicions, ascribed motives and unthinking deeds.

The assassination of General Ironsi [an Ibo, head of the new government], the slaughter of thousands of Ibos in the rest of Nigeria and the flight of well over a million Ibos to their homeland all served eventually to convince some 8 million Ibos that their only hope of survival was in asserting their sovereignty, hopefully in association with some 4 million of the minority tribes that stood between them and the sea, including the rich oil-bearing areas of the Niger Delta.

This final decision to secede came on 30 May 1967 and followed a series of fruitless efforts to compromise differences in a way that would keep the country together.

But if the decision to secede unified the Ibos, it had no less impact on the rest of Nigeria which felt strongly that any concession of the right of secession would irreparably splinter the entire nation. And, as already indicated, the decision ran headlong into some deeply held —and strongly articulated—concerns on the part of the rest of Africa.

The U.S. Position

For the reasons outlined at the beginning of this statement, we have continued our recognition of the Federal Government and the unity of Nigeria. At the same time, we have also sought to use our influence to encourage a peaceful resolution of the problems which have divided the parties.

As disease and famine have mounted, we have appealed to the parties to set aside the political issues of the war in the interests of reaching an urgent humanitarian agreement which would permit the starving to be fed. . . . The deep suspicions and fears of both parties to the conflict have thus far frustrated the efforts of the International Committee of the Red Cross and the Organization of African Unity, supported by the U.S. and many other nations, to reach an effective agreement.

In the meantime . . . large quantities of foodstuffs have been accumulated both in Federal territory and in the offshore islands. The U.S. Government, the largest donor, has contributed a total of almost $9 million to this effort in cash and surplus food commodities; private American voluntary organizations have added another $2.7 million.

President Johnson in a message to Emperor Haile Selassie on 5 August described the relief of starving civilian populations as among the basic obligations of common humanity. . . . The humanitarian aspects of the problem, however, are a legitimate cause for concern not only for Africa but for the entire world.

Titan Launch Advances Communications Satellite Program

The latest launch of the Air Force's Titan III-C added another milestone in the effort to develop an advanced tactical communications satellite system—a system which will ultimately allow elements of the Defense Department to relay orders directly to soldiers in the battlefield or aircraft in flight from far distant command posts.

The future of this system was pushed one more step along when the 2.4 million pound thrust Titan lifted four research and development satellites into 22,300 mile orbits.

Of the four systems on board, the principal one was Lincoln Experimental Satellite No. 6 (LES-6), a 360-pound, drum-shaped radio satellite built by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology's Lincoln Laboratories in Bedford, Mass.

LES-6 has a solid-state communications repeater among its many components and will operate in the military UHF band for use with ground and aircraft link terminals.

This advanced version transmits circularly polarized radio signals which permit ground terminals to use small, simple receiving antennas instead of the usual large and complex ground stations. A combination of eight pairs of dipoles and cavity-backed slots around the periphery of the satellite produces this polarization and reduces fading and drop-outs caused by the ionosphere.

LES-6 is a part of an overall program to develop a tactical satellite communication system which will include TATS, Tactical Transmission System. This is a frequency hopping modulation device that permits many messages to be carried simultaneously by a tactical satellite.

The satellite is about 5½ feet in length and four feet in diameter and draws its power from solar cells covering almost all of its outer surface. An improved antenna system gives it a radiated power of more than 600 watts.

Sensors and logic systems carried aboard LES-6 will permit it to operate in an equatorial orbit at synchronous altitude, all automatically. This was the first such self-contained station-keeping system to be tested in orbit.

The largest unit on board the Titan was a 475-pound environmental research satellite carrying 11 separate experiments aimed at advancing knowledge of the trapped radiation environment and solar flare particle events.

The other two satellites on board will conduct experiments on heat transfer and particle radiation in space.

STAGE ZERO—Shown above is an artist's concept of the Air Force Titan III-C launch vehicle after "stage zero" and heat shield separation, following liftoff from the AF Eastern Test Range, Cape Kennedy. Atop the "core-vehicle" are the payloads and their launch truss.

NATO Exercise SILVER TOWER Completed in North Atlantic

A more effective defense organization was the designated aim of a large scale NATO maritime exercise started Sept. 16 in the North Atlantic Ocean. The exercise, nicknamed "SILVER TOWER," was completed Sept. 27.

Nine NATO countries took part in the combined exercise. Maritime forces were provided by Belgium, Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom and the United States.

More than 100 ships participated, including NATO's Standing Naval Force Atlantic, a multi-national squadron of destroyers and frigates presently consisting of ships from the U. S., U. K., and the Netherlands.

"SILVER TOWER" exercised NATO and national forces and headquarters in their defense tasks both on the Eastern and Western sides of the Atlantic. The combined forces conducted fleet maneuvers which included anti-submarine warfare, air strikes, mining and minesweeping, submarine operations and convoy escort, for which a large number of merchant ships were chartered.

Senate Report on Strategic Power

(Continued from Page 1)

military objective is "to deter aggression at any level—should deterrence fail, to terminate hostilities, in concert with our allies, under conditions of relative advantage while limiting damage to the U.S. and minimizing damage to the U.S. and allied interests."

"This objective," the report continues," cannot be attained by blueprints or deferred deployments. Forces in being are required to deter a potential aggressor."

While recognizing that the United States no longer enjoys overwhelming superiority in the nuclear weapons field, the report states that the "United States is relying on qualitative improvements rather than increased numbers of delivery vehicles to maintain its deterrent posture."

Such an approach ". . . places a heavy burden on our scientific and engineering community to stay out in front in the technological race."

In outlining the Soviet strategic threat, the subcommittee's report noted ". . . the high priority which the U.S.S.R. has given and is giving to strategic nuclear offense and defense. . . .

"The Soviet willingness to devote resources and determination to push for superiority in this field is substantiated by Soviet military spending for 1967. With a gross national product of less than half that of the United States," the report continued, "Soviet military and space spending in 1967 approached U.S. defense cost, if the expense of the war in Southeast Asia is excluded. In terms of rubles . . . this constitutes about 10 percent of the Soviet GNP."

The results of this spending, the report continued, can be seen in the growth of the Soviet intercontinental ballistic missile force from fewer than 100 launchers in 1963 to 700 by late 1967, the construction of a new nuclear-powered submarine comparable to the U.S. Polaris submarine, and the development of a fractional orbit bombardment system. This weapon would be launched at the opening of hostilities, and a nuclear warhead brought down on a preselected target on its first pass around the globe.

The subcommittee's report also outlines the priority being given by Chinese Communist leaders to the development of modern strategic attack weapons.

In analyzing the U.S. strategic forces in being and projected, the subcommittee notes that the size of the U.S. force has remained generally constant since 1964.

However, the report adds that "there have been . . . important changes in the mix of this force as the older bombers (B–47's and B–52C–F's) and the early Minutemen I missiles were phased down, and improved Polaris and Minutemen II were added. Thus, the improvements in our capability have been qualitative, rather than quantitative."

The present force of land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles will be strengthened as the improved Minuteman III is phased into the system. Continuing with its assessment of the U.S. strategic force, the subcommittee's members noted that the ". . . Joint Chiefs of Staff support the immediate development and production of the advanced manned strategic aircraft . . ." to maintain the U.S. strategic bomber capability in the face of Soviet advances.

The report also says that as the Poseidon, a new missile with greater accuracy and more throw weight, comes into the inventory in the 1970's a number of Polaris submarines will have been converted to handle that missile.

In the field of strategic defensive forces, the report says the Department of Defense had proposed to modernize the nation's air defense system to increase its capabilities against low altitude penetrations and missile attacks.

While recognizing that ". . . the determination of the proper size and capabilities of the offensive and defensive strategic forces which are needed involve a number of factors, . . ." the subcommittee's report recommends ". . . a mixed and balanced force of land-based and sea-based ballistic missiles and long-range manned bombers . . ." to provide flexibility of response in the event of an enemy attack, and a program of accelerated research and development in the field of advanced intercontinental ballistic missiles.

PLANESIDE GREETING—Secretary of the Navy Paul R. Ignatius is welcomed to Elmendorf AFB, Alaska, by Army Brig. Gen. Francis J. Roberts, chief of staff of the unified Alaskan Command. Secretary Ignatius, en route to the Pacific area, received briefings on the Alaskan Command, Alaskan Air Command and Alaskan North American Defense Region during his two-hour stopover.

Deployment

(Continued from Page 1)

capability, General Abrams considered the U.S. armored cavalry squadron scheduled for deployment to Vietnam not presently required there. Gen. Abrams prefers to use the thousand spaces for other purposes, he said.

As a consequence, the 1st Armored Cavalry Regiment, a recently-mobilized California National Guard unit now stationed at Fort Lewis, Wash., will not be deployed to Southeast Asia this fall as previously planned. Instead, it will be assigned to the Strategic Army Forces in the continental United States. The Army said the unit has satisfactorily completed all of its training tests.

Private Employers Urged to Give Veterans Preference in Hiring

Congress has asked private employers to give veterans preference in hiring. The request came in a resolution which declared it to be the sense of Congress that agencies of the federal government should:

Give preference to job-seeking veterans.

2—Seek to get private industry to voluntarily give veterans priority.

The resolution also asked private employers to "exert every effort to carry out the objectives and purposes" of the resolution, the Veterans Administration said.

The VA said their experience indicated that—except for the veteran who is going back to school this fall—the one overriding need of today's veteran is to get an adequate satisfying job.

Although the government has instituted various programs to implement this request, the importance of securing full cooperation from private employers is underscored by the fact that six of every seven Americans are employed in private industry, the VA noted.

In his second annual veterans message to Congress last January, President Johnson asked Congress to call upon the nation's employers in behalf of the veteran. He said:

"A man who has fought for his country deserves gratitude. But gratitude can be no substitute for the job he wants—and needs."

In responding to the President's request, Congress supported the President's position saying "one of the most immediate and acute needs of members of the armed forces upon discharge . . . is to obtain early and suitable employment in positions which will enable them to be self-reliant, which will provide meaning, purpose and fulfillment in their lives . . ."

Employers hiring new veterans are not simply lending a helping hand because of the "great personal sacrifices" veterans have made "to defend freedom and bring justice and peace to the world," the VA said.

"In return, employers will be getting men who have gone through a period of rigorous discipline and training; men whose judgment has matured with experience; men whose military service is now behind them; men who are now ready to begin their careers, establish households and settle down to raise families."

The VA said "veterans are among the most stable and promising employee prospects in the labor market today."

ROAD OPENING—Lt. Gen. Lam, ARVN, I Corps Commanding General, and Lt. Gen. R. E. Cushman Jr., CG, III Marine Amphibious Force, exchange greetings after the ribbon-cutting ceremony which officially opened the new road between Hue and Thuan-An, Vietnam.

Veterans Urged to Check On Insurance Opportunities

The Veterans Administration has urged thousands of disabled veterans —largely young veterans—to take advantage of the valuable insurance opportunities available to them.

The special low-cost insurance is available only to veterans separated from service after April 24, 1951, who have been rated by the VA as having a service-connected disability.

Disability ratings are given to some 7,000 veterans each month and each is encouraged to apply for the special "RH" insurance. Today only about 16 per cent submit applications despite the low premiums.

A 25-year-old veteran, for example, can start a $10,000 insurance program for only $2.60 a month.

The VA emphasized that veterans who receive disability ratings may apply for the insurance whether or not they converted their Servicemen's Group Life Insurance to a private policy after they got out of military service.

Even if he converted his SGLI policy, the VA encourages him to apply for the RH insurance. RH and a converted SGLI policy offer an opportunity to carry $20,000 insurance at standard premiums. Many could not qualify for other insurance or could do so only at increased permiums.

When a veteran's disability rating is established, the VA informs each veteran that he is entitled to apply. The application must be submitted within one year from the establishment date.

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